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Over the past two decades, higher education in advanced capitalist societies has 
undergone a process of radical “reform”. A key element of this reform has been the 
introduction of a number of accounting-based techniques in the pursuit of improved 
accountability and transparency. While the “old” accounting was to do with 
stewardship, the “new” accounting is to do with performance. In accordance with the 
performance principle, the publishing companies and the higher education funding 
bodies have engaged in ranking exercises. These exercises impact on all aspects of 
academic life as the entities that are ranked and rated include universities, disciplines, 
journals, and academics and their “outputs” in teaching and research. This paper 
explores the genesis and the consequences of the performance discourse. It argues for 
a philosophical separation of the notions of accountability and accounting. 
Furthermore, it raises the issue of academic accountability as something that exceeds 
the logic of accounting.  
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper begins in a rather unconventional way. A thought experiment is proposed. We know 
thought experiments are imagined scenarios, but they can help us understand things as they are 
rather than as they appear to be. The understanding comes through reflection on the situation. 
They help us focus on the key issues. Here is the experiment:  
The Government has decided to place all High Court Judges on a performance 
evaluation scheme. Under this scheme, all judges are required to submit at least four of 
their best judgements in an audit period to an expert-panel. The panel will then rate 
these judgements in terms of quality and impact on society on a five-point scale. The 
panel will have some flexibility in considering cases where exceptional circumstances 
have resulted in a judge producing fewer than four judgements. Any judge who does 
not receive a quality rating of two is likely to be in trouble. Any judge who does not 
submit his or her evidence/judgement portfolio will be zero-rated. Any judge who 
consistently receives a rating of five is likely to be promoted. The rating-5 judges get 
to move around to help the low-performing judges to improve their rating. 
The key issue here is: does the above institutional arrangement enable the judges to discharge 
their obligation without fear or favour?  The reason for invoking the analogy with the judiciary is 
apparent: just as the fundamental obligation of judges is to justice and the law, and not to 
economic or other consequences, the fundamental obligation of academics is to truth,1 as opposed 
to its consequences (Miller, 2000).  
1.Whether academics argue for an absolute or relative truth or question the possibility of attaining any truth is not an 
issue here, the issue is that they remain true to themselves, i.e. write according to the dictates of their conscience. The 
institutional arrangements allow them to fulfil their obligation to seek their truth in their disciplines, and beyond, 
without fear or favour.  
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Thus, it can be argued that both academics and judges need institutional arrangements that enable 
them to discharge their obligations to society, and it is in society’s best interest to grant them 
these conditions. 
Over the past two decades, higher education in advanced capitalist societies has undergone a 
process of radical “reform”. A key element of this reform has been the introduction of a number 
of accounting-based techniques in the pursuit of improved accountability and transparency. 
Evidently, there was accounting in higher education prior to this movement. While the “old” 
accounting was to do with stewardship, the “new” accounting is to do with “performativity”.2 
This paper is aimed at exploring the Research Assessments and Rankings (RAR), which is only 
one element of the accounting-based changes that have been introduced in the systemic 
“reformation” of higher education. It is structured as follows: It begins with a historical sketch of 
the university as an institution to contextualise the issue. Then it looks at the RAR phenomenon 
and its foundations. The third section looks at the rhetoric and the reality of higher education on a 
RAR-based accountability. The fourth section discusses whether we are the victims or the 
perpetrators of RAR, followed by brief concluding remarks.  
THE UNIVERSITY—A HISTORICAL SKETCH 
While there is some debate about the traditional model of the university, any discussion on this 
topic generally includes the British or Cardinal Newman’s model and the German or Humboldtian 
model. It is Newman’s idea that still holds the most resonance in the Anglo-American context. 
Traditionally, the university was accountable to itself; a practice that probably began in 
Newman’s time when the academic community was subject to Canon law, but protected from the 
secular courts. The essentially secular Australian university was established in the 1850s. It began 
as a public institution serving public purposes. It imported its collegial traditions from Britain. It 
had institutional autonomy whereby management necessarily meant self-management. Insulated 
from the market and market-like behaviours,3 academic life was a vocation. Academic 
accountability was to do with responsibility, obligation or simply doing the right thing; 
presumably based on a certain amount of trust. However, this was no “golden age”; it had its 
share of problems (Moodie, 1995; Brown, 1996). 
An important period in the recent life of the university was the 1980s. During that time, in a 
number of western countries, there was a move towards New Public Management (NPM) or New 
Public Financial Management (NPFM) (Hood 1991, 1995). It was not a uniform package. 
Different types of reforms were promoted at different levels of government by different political 
parties in different economic and social contexts. However, there were some common elements in 
the NPM movement. First, market forces were deemed to provide the best model of 
accountability; where they were absent, pseudo-market mechanisms were to be introduced. 
Second, it involved a seemingly endless list of accounting-based techniques (Olson, Guthrie and 
Humphrey, 1998).  
2. According to Lyotard (1984), postmodernity was characterised by the end of metanarratives. So in an answer to the 
question “what legitimates knowledge”, his reply was performativity. It meant the "technological criterion" or the 
most efficient input/output ratio.  
3. Market and market-like behaviours are terms coined by Slaughter and Leslie (1997). The former refers to the for-
profit activity on the part of institutions, activities such as patenting and subsequent royalty and licensing agreements, 
spin-off companies, arm’s-length corporations, and university-industry partnerships, when these have a profit 
component. The latter refers to the institutional and faculty competition for funding, whether these are from external 
grants and contracts, endowment funds, university-industry partnerships or student tuition and fees. What makes 
these activities market-like is that they involve competition for funds from external resource providers.  
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This introduced the accounting- and auditing-based vocabularies in everyday life in hospitals, 
schools and universities. The reconstruction of the university was a part of the NPM movement. It 
meant profound changes to the idea of a university. Academic life changed tremendously since 
our accountability changed from humanistic, thus holistic, to one of “keeping a score”.  
In the Australian context, this conception of accountability translated into a Janus-headed 
arrangement as the purported financial autonomy for universities was contingent upon their 
performance in relation to agreed goals. The same arrangement was extended to individual 
academics, heads of school and vice-chancellors. Performance measurement and performance 
management are both classic techniques in business. As they entered the university, so did the 
whole gamut of the “new” accounting.4 Its applicability to academic life was left unquestioned as 
the experts—accountants and managers—were entrusted with the task of demonstrating 
accountability. The support for the market-based reforms came from the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and this continues to be the case until now. 
According to the OECD, the rightful role of education lies in the contribution it can make to 
international economic reconstruction and competitiveness through: producing more “flexible” 
and “responsive” forms of labour; fostering greater participation by the private sector in higher 
education, especially through research and requiring that higher education operate more like the 
private market (Smyth, 1995). The OECD pronouncements, that espouse the Chicago School-
based human capital theory, have been serving as an influential steering medium for higher 
education policy. While it has no prescriptive mandate over its member countries, this globalising 
(and globalised) agency is one of the main actors that is engaged in developing and promoting 
performance indicators. These initiatives are not a top-down process; we have a two-way 
relationship with OECD’s Education Committee (Lingard & Rizvi, 1998). Besides the OECD, 
there are other transnational and supranational bodies that are involved in steering the policy 
changes (Newson, 1998).  
RESEARCH ASSESSMENTS AND RANKINGS 
And everywhere governments are watching this issue with great interest, because in its 
way it is the perfect performance indicator, nice and short with no collection costs. 
One issue has everyone transfixed. This issue is driven not by faculty or presidents or 
boards or governments but by the Times, Newsweek and one Chinese university, 
Shanghai Jiao Tong. That issue is global university rankings. (Marginson, 2006: 1) 
The U.S. News & World Report (USNWR) introduced rankings in higher education in 1983. 
These are based upon the data which the U.S. News compiles from each institution either from an 
annual survey sent to each school or from the school's website. The opinions of faculty and 
administrators who do not belong to the school are also taken into account. The USNWR rankings 
are deemed to be one of the most influential media-based and faculty-assisted initiatives in US 
higher education. It is only a handful of American institutions that have refused to cooperate with 
it (Diver, 2005). Today the rankings exercise has become a multimillion-dollar industry for 
magazines and book publishers. The media-based rankings are conducted mainly by: The Atlantic 
Monthly, BusinessWeek, Newsweek, Forbes, Maclean's Guide to Canadian Universities, Hobsons 
Good Universities’ Guide, Times Higher Education QS World University Rankings and The Wall 
Street Journal. In Germany, the Centre for Higher Education Development (CHE) has 
collaborated with the publisher Die Zeit to produce the CHE rankings.  
4. The new accounting-based concepts include: Quality Assurance (QA); Total Quality Management (TQM); ISO 
9000; Output Measurement; Outcome Indicators; Academic Audit; Quality Audit; Program/Output Budgeting; 
Strategic Planning; Benchmarking; Rankings; Outsourcing; Efficiency and Effectiveness Indicators; Productivity 
Gains; Balanced Scorecard and Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), and Activity Based Costing (ABC). ABC has 
been promoted to determine the “true” costs of disciplinary units and appropriate user charges.  
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In terms of RAR conducted by the higher education funding bodies, the British have had their 
Research Assessment Exercises (RAEs). The New Zealand version is Performance-Based 
Research Funding (PBRF). The object of calculation varies. In the RAEs, it is an academic unit, 
and in PBRF, it is the individual academic. In Australia, since the early 1990s almost all core 
funding has been allocated on the basis of measured performance. The method for distributing 
research block funding has been the quantitative performance measures (i.e. number of 
publications, external research income and Higher Degree by Research (HDR) student load and 
completions) that are used as proxies for quality. Around 2004, the Department of Education, 
Science and Training (DEST) announced the Research Quality Framework (RQF). In December 
2007, Senator Kim Carr, the new Minister for Innovation, Industry, Science and Research, 
announced that the Rudd Government would halt the implementation of the RQF. The RQF will 
be replaced by a new, streamlined, internationally-recognised research quality assurance process 
using metrics or other agreed quality measures which are appropriate to each research discipline. 
The Government will work with the higher education sector to develop the new system, taking 
advantage of the existing work which has been done on metrics development, but also developing 
robust quality measures for the humanities, creative arts and social sciences.  
Clearly, there are different varieties of the rankings discourse in different national higher 
education systems. Through this paper, I will use RAR as an umbrella term to include all these 
versions. Although these versions involve different methodologies, and have different ranking 
agencies, they all aid resource allocation. They are all premised on the same logic. This logic 
entails: (a) a reification of students, academic disciplines, academics and their outputs in teaching 
and research, (b) market forces5 control for quality, (c) quality is quantifiable, and (d) what can be 
counted counts and more accounting amounts to more accountability. Indeed, research quality is 
an important issue. Most of us would hope that the quality of our research would have a positive 
impact on our discipline and the society that we live in. The intent of RAR conducted by the 
higher education funding bodies is to identify and reward quality research. Here the issues are: Is 
number of publications an indicator of quality of publications? Is quality measurement of 
scholarly output amenable to the methods used in industrial production?  What are the intended 
and unintended consequences of this exercise?  
A reference to the origins of Quality Control (QC) and Total Quality Management (TQM), and 
the purported link between TQM in industry and education is necessary at this point. Before the 
Industrial Revolution, workers were responsible for the quality of their work. QC came in after 
the Industrial Revolution. It involved sampling the industrial output to determine quality. Quality 
was broadly defined as conformity to specifications and fitness for purpose. There were quality 
inspectors to make sure that conformity, thus quality, existed. Over the years, the quality 
movement expanded in to a broader management approach called TQM. It has been considered as 
one of the most important management issues since the late 1980s. TQM enshrines the customer 
view of quality. In fact, it suggests that everyone is a customer. In other words, organisations first 
focus on the external customers’ needs and then work backwards through all internal customers or 
employees’ needs. Thus, customer satisfaction becomes the driving force for an organisation. 
Now, under the NPM it has become the same in higher education. An English authority on quality 
in education is Edwards Sallis. In TQM in Education, Sallis explains how TQM developed in 
industry and how it can be applied to educational institutions.  
5. Market forces are assumed to operate at levels such as: local, national, global, inter-disciplinary, inter-institutional 
and commercial. Where there is no market, a market situation is contrived by the funding body. 
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He describes the historical links between TQM in industry and education,6 and how these have 
developed in the United Kingdom since the late 1980s. Now, it would appear that the RAR—in 
all its forms—extends this link to the point at which it treats education as an industry. 
Looking at the RAR through a Foucauldian lens, it becomes clear that it is a modern form of 
power that is simultaneously both totalising and individualising. It aims at ordering the whole 
system while ranking everyone within it. It impacts on all aspects of academic life as the entities 
that are ranked and rated include universities, disciplines, journals, and academics and their 
“outputs” in both teaching and research. Following a Darwinian logic, it operates to make 
universities control academics in the same way that the government controls universities. It 
focuses on key performance indicators (KPIs) to produce quantifiable scores that can be used for 
setting department against department, institution against institution and, in some versions, pitting 
individual academics against each other. In this process, all involved become factors in planning 
and organisation of intellectual production—the use value, ethical value and human relations—all 
are reduced to a quantitative measure. The idea is that all entities in the system—academics, 
disciplines, universities—work on improving their scores. These scores are deemed to be the 
evidence of academic accountability and they are used by the Government to distribute funds to 
universities. In contrast, the media-based rankings influence the flow of resources in an indirect 
way. It is what Hirsch (1976) called a positional competition; a zero-sum game in which what 
winners win, losers lose.  
The Flawed Foundations? 
There is certainly a prima facie case for the media-based rankings. They provide useful 
information to prospective students. Information such as entry scores and other academic 
demographics should be made available under freedom of information. I believe the problem is 
not with presenting the individual data elements, but in the publishers’ attempt to combine these 
elements into a single ordinal scale. In the same vein, the British version of the RAR discourse 
culminates in grades (thus funding), say, Classics 3 and Marketing 5 for a university. Assuming 
the algorithms and the statistical manipulation are in order, one can accept these grades to be 
valid. But are they sound? As we know a sound argument must not only be valid, it must also 
have well-grounded premises. And, it is only sound arguments whose conclusions that we must 
accept. Thus, it may do well to examine the premise of this discourse. 
First, it is premised on an unrelenting faith in accounting as the science of resource allocation. 
This is presumably a legacy of Enlightenment thought. This science rests on making the 
dissimilar (academics, their environment, their disciplines and disciplinary paradigms) 
comparable according to abstract, supposedly value-free laws. Based on this logic, disciplines as 
diverse as Classics and Marketing in a university can be ranked on an ordinal scale. In Marxian 
terms, it is a subsumption of use value into the exchange value. I believe any ranking system, in 
this context, is untenable and reductionist. How do we value Classics and Marketing? Matters 
such as these remain an issue of substantive judgement and debate. RAR can determine their 
grades (thus price and funding), but completely bypass their use value. The use of numbers in 
such matters is a way out of a political debate, as the numbers tend to command some kind of 
scientific authority. These numbers become all the more persuasive if they have been audited. 
Second, this discourse is premised on faith in the powers of institutionalised competition to 
enhance scholarship. This translates into: the more intense the competition, the greater is the 
quality of scholarly work.  
6. Others with a similar stance include: Total Quality Management in Higher Education (Sherr & Teeter, 1991) TQM 
for Professors and Students (Bateman & Roberts, 1992). 
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This premise is equally unsound as much of our work depends on rather different forms of human 
subjectivity. If we look at the enduring pieces of work in both arts and sciences, we find none of 
these were created under the conditions of institutionalised competition. While competition can 
help improve short-term research performance, it can simultaneously destroy the culture that 
enables new research to emerge. It can threaten the social and psychological conditions necessary 
for creative intellectual work (Brett, 1997; Marginson & Considine, 2000). In the words of a 
scientist-cum-philosopher Michael Polanyi: 
If the scientists of the world are viewed as a team setting out to explore the existing 
openings for discovery, it is assumed that their efforts will be efficiently coordinated if 
only each is left to follow his own inclinations. It is claimed in fact that there is no 
other efficient way of organising the team, and that any attempts to co-ordinate their 
efforts by directives of a superior authority would inevitably destroy the effectiveness 
of their cooperation. (Polanyi, 1951: 34) 
While there are differences between scientists and other academics, Polanyi provides a good 
description of the way in which scholarly work typically proceeds. Let me make it clear that I 
welcome the idea of friendly rivalry, which can be energising. It is the institutionalised 
competition for limited resources that I believe is a matter of concern. 
Third, this discourse is premised on the idea that peer review can provide ratings on quality. This 
changes the peer review tradition substantively. In Who are my Peers? Research Assessments in 
Philosophy, Sayers (1997) argues that peer review sounds reassuringly cosy and communitarian, 
but it is doubtful whether it operates that way in a subject as divided as philosophy. He goes on to 
say that rating philosophical work on a seven-point scale is, inherently, a crude business. I believe 
his argument is applicable to other disciplines too. Take my discipline, accounting, for example; 
increasingly it has become a divided subject. Broadly we have two divisions such as the 
mainstream accounting, and critical accounting movement. Both have very different ontological 
and epistemological assumptions. Both are very different ways of looking at the world and the 
role of accounting in that world. While one could provide a commentary on intellectual strengths, 
weaknesses and blind spots of papers in these divisions, any attempt to rank papers in paradigms 
as diverse as these amounts to comparing apples and oranges. This exercise is likely to be further 
complicated by the fact that peers are competitors too, and it is a zero-sum game. In terms of the 
way in which peer reviews have worked in Anthropology: 
In the QAA's new quality assurance framework, 'peer review' means a few senior 
academics setting the 'benchmarks' for their discipline as well as inspecting 
performance. A 'discipline', which once might have been characterized as a loose 
network of colleagues sharing common discourses and ways of seeing, is now coming 
to mean a hierarchical organization whose senior members are capable of acting on 
behalf of all its staff and students and of speaking to government with one voice. 
(Shore & Wright, 1999) 
Gillies (2006) explains that the history of science shows that peer review can give results, which 
later turn out to have been quite erroneous. It often happens that researchers produce work, which 
is judged at the time by their fellow researchers to be worthless, but which is later, sometimes 
much later, recognised to have been a major advance. I believe this argument can be extended to 
social sciences and humanities as well. In terms of quality, Alvesson and Willmott (1996) aptly 
assert that the achievement of quality in higher education “is essentially political in origin”. The 
politics, though, are concealed behind a facade that suggests “that ‘achieving quality’ is amenable 
to technical and bureaucratic solutions”. See Readings (1996: 25–26) for a critical analysis of the 
arbitrary quality of the weighting of the factors that are used in media-based university rankings, 
and the dubiousness of such quantitative indicators of quality.  
Singh 19 
 
THE RAR-BASED ACCOUNTABILITY: THE RHETORIC AND THE REALITY  
 “We now spend more time giving an account of what we are doing than we spend 
actually doing it…Just this sense of loss of agency, of autonomy, and a feeling that 
things have been done to you. So it is really a sense of a loss of professional decision-
making capacity.” (Academics’ responses cited in Vidovich & Currie, 1998: 193) 
These are not isolated cases. These views strike a chord with many of us. Are these responses the 
lifeworld pathologies of a new class in academic labour? 
Since the 1987 Green paper, the official government policy has repeatedly emphasised that there 
need not be any conflict between accountability and academic autonomy. Vidovich and Currie 
(1998), in their study of three Australian universities (Sydney, Murdoch and Edith Cowan), found 
overall the respondents from all three universities experienced greater accountability and reduced 
autonomy. They conducted interviews on the changing nature of academic work during 1994 and 
1995. In their work, they considered two distinct notions of autonomy: autonomy for the 
institution to act independently of government (be self-determining), and autonomy of individuals 
within institutions to act as professionals to govern themselves and be free to speak out on any 
issue. In terms of accountability, they looked at accountability both in teaching and research. 
A pursuit of RAR-based accountability can explain some academics’ attempt to publish what is 
essentially the same article in two or three journals. One cannot blame them, they are forced to 
play and sometimes beat the management at its own game. Alternatively, academics encounter 
other dilemmas of accountability, “a book might count for, say, two points, which might be 
$3,000. A journal article might count for the same, so which would you do?” (an academic’s 
response, in Selling Australia’s Universities, The Age, December 9, 2000).  I believe this response 
is not atypical under the scorekeeping type of accountability. Hopwood (2005) makes a very apt 
observation when he says “we have become concerned with the ‘hits’ more than the content and 
direction of our investigations”. These are two contradictory trends that result simultaneously 
from the same cause. In the “hits” we seem to affirm ourselves, and in our diminished concern for 
the content and direction of our investigations, we negate ourselves. In this instrumental 
rationality, where intellectual passion and curiosity are replaced by fear or ambition, I believe 
something is bound to be lost to the investigator and the investigation on hand.  
Over the years, I have known colleagues to design a research project for its potential to attract a 
competitive grant, a large Australian Research Council (ARC) or other external grant. For some, 
it has meant avoiding open-ended long-term projects as they have become concerned with 
optimising their performance. Marginson and Considine find “in one Sandstone university 
medical department, a professor noted that he was under pressure to apply for external grants, but 
the university showed less interest in what the research actually achieved. Others have similar 
stories” (2000: 135). When steered by bureaucratic carrots or sticks, researchers are likely to 
achieve RAR-type accountability at the expense of freedom of intellectual inquiry, the free flow 
of ideas, and mutual trust between participants. In this managed environment, the researchers’ 
areas and priorities change; it is almost as if getting research funding becomes an end in itself. 
Intellectual risks are avoided; the success in research becomes success in obtaining money for 
research!  This competition for research funding is a competition for rankings, not for quality, 
explain Marginson and Considine (2000). Such steering on an ongoing basis could weaken the 
important, but unfashionable (not on the Government’s priority list) areas of fundamental inquiry. 
These mechanisms amount to social control of intellectual labour, and this has an impact on the 
construction of knowledge. For instance, while legal knowledge is best created through the 
preparation of casebooks, academics are under pressure to raise ARC grants to boost departmental 
ratings.  
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As expected the RAR discourse translates into university’s closer relationship with industry and 
business sectors. What has been happening with research in science and engineering? Slaughter 
and Leslie (1995, 1997) examined public research universities in the United States, Canada, the 
United Kingdom and Australia. They found a move away from a leap into the dark or curiosity-
based research towards applied, targeted or entrepreneurial research; a proliferation of university-
corporate linkages; an emergence of academic entrepreneurship, including academics engaged in 
developing intellectual property. While the latter is perceived to be beneficial by many in the 
applied sciences, the pertinent issues are: 
How far can routine entrepreneurial activity be extended before becoming the central 
routine of academic units?  How much can academics invest in the development of 
intellectual property without becoming head of small firms more committed to 
external bodies and markets than to the educational mission of the institution? 
(Slaughter & Leslie, 1995: 126) 
It is evident that the industry-led technoscience movement is supported by both the political 
leaders and the university managers. This explains the emergence of the university-industry-
government centres and partnerships, say in biotechnology. Some of these unions are manifesting 
in rather disturbing ways where the academics and universities themselves all have equity stakes 
in the companies sponsoring trials (Bollier, 2002). It calls for a collision of two cultures. While 
the industry demands commercial confidentiality and patenting, the academic lifeworld needs to 
have a free exchange of ideas. The intention here is not to argue for an ivory tower university. 
Indeed, there is a need for interaction between universities, industry, government and the wider 
community. In certain circumstances, these linkages can be used for the benefit of all parties 
concerned. However, once they become the driving force for the university, then the academic 
lifeworld is likely to be colonised, the social gift exchange is bound to be undermined.7 As 
Benson and Strangroom (2006: 135) aptly observe, where corporate interests intersect with 
scientific practice, then objectivity can very quickly go to the wall. 
ACADEMICS—THE VICTIMS OR THE PERPETRATORS? 
The late professor Karl Popper spent some time at the University of Canterbury, in New Zealand. 
Professor Noam Chomsky has been invited to Sydney University. Both are academics of 
tremendous intellectual force. They would have inspired, infuriated or confused many academics 
at these universities. This is to be expected, this is the nature of academic life. Now imagine, if the 
condition of their visit was to assist their host university to improve its performance and produce 
x number of refereed outputs. How would it have impacted on the social relations of their work? 
As I understand, it has become quite common to invite high performers to improve the host 
school’s research output just in time for the next research assessment exercise.  
Polster and Newson (1998) explore the way in which the KPI movement can reorder the social 
relations of our work, and they see a danger in a strategy that supports academic workers 
themselves becoming involved in improving performance indicators so that they can measure 
things better. I think many of us have already internalised the KPI movement. Take the case of 
academic unions. They have become involved in designing workload models and productivity 
gain allocations. In general, the workload model or performance plan specifies x number of 
refereed publications for an academic for the assessment period. In some versions, it mentions the 
number of hours that may be needed to produce the outputs. This is a classic standard costing 
technique where direct labour per unit is specified, and the number of units to be produced in a 
period are also specified. Is academic work suitable to this technique? 
7. See The Kept University (The Atlantic, March 2000) and Bollier (2002) for some cases regarding corporate power 
over the academe and the “inconvenient” research findings. Consider the case of the tobacco giant Philip Morris and 
its “Project Whitecoat”. 
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It would appear that our urge to plan our performance is so strong that we forget it is the 
incalculable nature of our obligation that defines scholarly life and work.  
Some heads of disciplines go so far as to specify the journals in which staff should publish and 
the areas of research in which they should concentrate if they wish to apply for tenure or 
promotion. There are schools which award a bonus for publications in the right journals and some 
organise prize competitions to similar ends (Hopwood, 2005). In some disciplines, we conduct 
studies that involve rankings journals, say on the basis of journal usefulness, user surveys or 
library holdings. Inevitably, different journals speak to different audiences or deal with different 
paradigms in a discipline. Some paradigms may be so different that one could say academics 
working in such different areas “live in different worlds”. This does not seem to deter some of us 
from conducting ranking studies. However, in any edifice, intellectual or otherwise, the 
construction will only hold if the foundation is secure. In preparation for the RQF, senior 
academics in some disciplines were constructing their own hierarchies of journals that were 
clustered in tiers. In Foucauldian terms, the inmates had come to discipline themselves. Here my 
concerns are threefold. First, the journal ranking studies are on methodologically weak 
foundations as they amount to ranking competing paradigms that are incommensurable. Second, it 
is ironic that these works count as scholarly publications when they provide the material for the 
ranking panopticon. Third, these works tend to limit the range of intellectual possibility by 
privileging the “top-rank". See Dominelli and Hoogvelt (1996) for a typology of responses by 
professional academics facing the market-based changes. It is good to note that the Arts and 
Humanities Research Board (UK) and the British Philosophical Society have boycotted any plans 
to create a “top ten” list of their most important journals (Baty, 2005). 
As I understand, in New Zealand and in Britain the Research Assessment panels were reminded 
that they were obliged to assess the quality of the content of individual articles, not the reputation 
of the journal in which they were published. I believe academic initiatives in ranking journals 
combined with the RAR imperative to rank academic papers inevitably creates a system that is 
both self-referential and self-perpetuating. Furthermore, a measure developed by a publishing 
giant to gauge the reputation of a journal is now being used to evaluate individual academics. I am 
referring to the impact factor here. As journal editors are also in the ratings market, they are likely 
to adopt policies that will increase their impact factor.   
Now, the question is whether academics are the victims or perpetrators in this exercise. I believe it 
is both, as the RAR has not only restrained academics, it has also (and for the same reasons) 
empowered them, albeit, conveniently for greater exchange value for themselves and their 
institutions. “Is 10 percent enough?  I’d be happy if it was more: 20 per cent would be good” says 
the QUT Dean of Business (Paydirt, The Australian, Higher Education, April 10, 2002). The rate 
here refers to the Dean’s bonus. The idea of a performance-based pay was so attractive that the 
QUT Dean chose to surrender her tenured position. The intention here is not to extrapolate from a 
single case. The point is performance-based contracts are becoming rather common in academic 
life. The pecking order dictates that while the deans work on achieving their targets, they 
supervise the performance of their heads of school as per performance agreements. Incidentally, 
there is no longer a dichotomy between academics and managers, as now we have what could be 
called a new class of “academic managers”. This translates into each of us managing our contract 
with society according to the targets, financial sanctions and rewards. It is clear that the 
ideological control is being gained by economic means in this process. As I understand at some 
universities, academics are provided with financial incentives to prepare funding submissions. 
The practice of tenure is being phased out and it is being replaced by what is called a continuing 
position. The latter means continuing subject to performance in relation to the agreed goals. We 
know goals and interests can steer all forms of enquiry: knowing the target that one wants to 
achieve tends to shape what one searches for and what one overlooks. I think the pressure to 
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achieve the RAR-induced goals—quantity of publications, frequency of citations in the 
professional literature—can potentially paralyse any original and creative thinking.  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Far from being a neutral and objective verification of “auditee” compliance with 
commonly accepted standards, audits “do as much to construct definitions of quality 
and performance as to monitor them” … To be audited, an organization must actively 
transform itself into an auditable commodity: one “structured to conform to the need 
to be monitored ex-post”. (Power, 1994: 33) 
The RAR-discourse has been instrumental in bringing the “accounting-based version of quality” 
in discussions on research. Its lexicon includes: “audits” of all kinds—internal, external, and 
institutional, “performance evaluation”; “efficiency and effectiveness”; “value for money”; 
“inputs”; “outputs; “outcomes”, “Benchmarking” and KPIs in academic life. This is the language 
and practice of the business world. Here my concerns are: first, private sector is hardly the 
epitome of accountability. One just has to look at the history of corporate scandals; it becomes 
clear that it has had problems in securing accountability. Second, and more importantly, should 
the public sector borrow its ideals and practices from the culture of economic consumption? Is it 
appropriate to implement private sector “economic reason” into the professions, in particular the 
“caring professions”, which dominate the public sector (Broadbent, Dietrich and Laughlin, 1996). 
(In Gorz’s (1989) thesis, caring professions are those devoted to health, education and the social 
services.) Third, while the business literature has come to recognise the pervasive use of financial 
sanctions and incentives, they can undermine creativity and impair productivity (Kohn, 1993); it 
is ironic that the public sector is following that path. Fourth, traditionally, accounting was 
theorised and prompted as a technology that provided useful information for internal and external 
decision-making. Since the late 1970s, this textbook image of accounting as an objective, value-
free, technical enterprise has been challenged. There is a vast amount of literature that has 
questioned this neutral image, and now accounting is recognised as a social and institutional 
phenomenon (Tinker, Merino & Neimark, 1982; Hopwood 1989). Fifth, as the power of this 
discourse lies in creating an overwhelming tendency to define substantive issues as technical 
issues, it serves to block reflection on many factors that determine the quality of academic life. It 
tends to distort the public debate.  
Though not the first to see these interrelationships, Foucault reminded us that our self-description, 
and thus our self-knowledge, depends on the linguistic resources that are available in our 
environment. As expected, the ranking regime—administered by the publishing companies, 
academics or the university managers—has brought in a redefinition of our everyday lives. It has 
influenced the way we talk (and think) about what we do both in terms of research and teaching. 
Reflecting on the psychodynamics that are submerged in our speech, it becomes clear while the 
freedom of the individual is romanticised in market liberal abstractions, things are very different 
in this market. Is it because the very means of guaranteeing freedom are endangering the freedom 
of the beneficiaries? My intention is not to resist academic accountability but to argue for a 
philosophical separation of the notions of accountability and accounting. The strength of the 
accounting discipline lies in quantification and calculation in representing “reality”. The expert-
generated and audited numbers are persuasive; many believe these numbers to be the evidence of 
accountability. However, in presenting these numbers, accountants both represent and construct 
that reality (Hines, 1988), as accountants choose what to account for, when and how to account 
for it. Accountants’ choice is determined by their politico-economic relations. This process gives 
selective visibility and it makes a lot of things invisible. And, it is what becomes invisible that 
underpins good practice in scholarship. As Tagg puts it: 
Singh 23 
 
…but I gain something much more valuable by pursuing the unauditable: friendship, 
collegiality, solidarity, openness, honesty, intellectual generosity, a rich exchange of 
ideas, trust. (2002: 9) 
I think if more of us are able to pursue the unauditable, then the quality of our scholarship will 
improve. The irony is RAR-culture destroys what it is meant to promote. It creates an auditable 
academic who is epistemologically conservative and economically liberal—who meets the 
satisfaction rating and the research productivity rate because he or she knows the targets. His or 
her research never ends up going down a blind alley. This competitive performer has no time to 
be collegial or intellectually generous; the exchange of ideas is fine as long as the percentage of 
authorship is settled. As I understand, in some performance evaluation schemes, we do have to 
disclose the percentage attributed to each author. Clearly, the RAR-discourse is 
“accountingisation” of the academic lifeworld. Power and Laughlin (1992: 133) coined this term 
to encompass measures introduced in various areas of public sector, including health, education 
and local government. Very aptly they said, “…accountingisation is perhaps an ugly word, but it 
expresses the sense in which accounting as a method may eclipse broader questions of 
accountability”. I believe all forms of RAR espouse what Vidovich and Currie (1998) call a 
bureaucratically defined and economically oriented version of accountability. The RAR-culture 
champions Weber’s “specialists without spirit”, who are likely to meet their productivity targets at 
the expense of challenging academic orthodoxies, corporate power and government priorities. 
Under these conditions, they will not have the freedom to do their duty.  
As more and more areas of our societal lifeworld have come into the grip of the laws of 
commodity economy, the greater is the need for someone to be a critic and the conscience of the 
society. If our universities are to resume that role, we will need to look at our contract with the 
society as a gift-exchange rather than as one of market exchange. This means we need a different 
way of thinking about our accountability: one that restores trust and autonomy to the academics, 
that uses qualitative, multiple and local measures, and is based on public dialogue (Shore & 
Wright, 1999). We need to move back to what Brint (1994) calls a social trustee professionalism. 
If we define academic accountability in the language of accounting, then we may be able to find 
the most efficient means to given ends, but we may lose the ability to call some ends into 
question. Under these conditions, we may perform, but can we fulfil our obligations? 
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